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An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality 
 
Abstract. 
Imagination is a source of evidence for objective modality. It is through this epistemic 
connection that the idea of modality first gains traction in our intellectual life. A proper 
theory of modality should be able to explain our imagination’s modal epistemic behaviors. 
This chapter highlights a peculiar asymmetry regarding epistemic defeat for imagination-based 
modal justification. Whereas imagination-based evidence for possibility cannot be 
undermined by information about the causal origin of our imaginings, unimaginability-based 
evidence for impossibility can be undermined by information about the causal origin of the 
unimaginability. It is argued that an acceptance of S4 over S5 as the true logic for objective 
modality best explains this epistemic asymmetry. 
 
1 Our Modal North Star 
Chance is an objective feature of reality. But it’s a puzzling feature. It isn’t even immediately clear 
how we might begin to theorize sensibly about chance. We need some kind of methodological 
anchor to set us on a proper path and tell us what to look for. 
Lewis has a suggestion. In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” (1980), he approaches 
this question by articulating a rational norm governing the relation between credence and chance, a 
norm known as the Principal Principle (PP). It’s a principle that tells us how a rational person’s 
credences should correlate with her beliefs about objective chances. Roughly put, it says that our 
credences should track our beliefs about objective chances. We will get into the detail of PP shortly. 
But the methodological point for now is that, even if we don’t know what objective chance really is, 
we clearly have a rudimentary conception of objective chance already; otherwise, we wouldn’t even 
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be asking questions about the nature of objective chance. The notion has already entered our 
intellectual life somehow, playing a certain cognitive role. Whatever metaphysics of objective chance 
we come up with, it shouldn’t deviate significantly from this rudimentary grasp; otherwise, we risk 
simply changing the subject. Lewis argues that PP is important because it captures our rudimentary 
grasp of objective chance. If we have a handle on the idea of objective chance at all, it stems from 
our thoughts about how certain we should be about things. A good metaphysics of objective chance 
must therefore be able to explain why chance and ideal credence correlate in the way PP says they 
do. PP serves as an Archimedean point that guides our search for a theory of chance. 
 This paper isn’t primarily about objective chance (though it will play a role). My main goal is to 
show what we can do with the epistemic connection between imagination and metaphysical modality by 
mimicking what Lewis did with the relation between credence and chance. 
Assuming that there is objective, metaphysical modality, it’s hard to wrap our heads around 
what modal reality is supposed to be. Drastically different hypotheses have been offered, from views 
that appeal to disconnected spacetime regions (Lewisian possible worlds) to views that appeal to 
powers of actual entities (e.g., Jacobs 2010). The logical space of admissible options is so vast that it 
can be intellectually crippling. Fortunately, like the concept of objective chance, the concept of 
objective modality isn’t a theoretical invention. The idea of possibility and necessity has already 
entered our intellectual life, playing a cognitive role, a role related to our imagination. 
Is a talking donkey metaphysically possible? I try to imagine a donkey talking and succeed. I 
thereby conclude that it is possible. Is it metaphysically possible for something to be all green and all 
red? I try but cannot imagine a surface colored that way. I thereby conclude that it is metaphysically 
impossible. It’s fairly common to move from what one can imagine to what is possible this way. It 
might be controversial to say that imaginability entails possibility (and that unimaginability entails 
impossibility). But it’s relatively safe to assume that imagination provides defeasible evidence for 
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possibility (and that unimaginability provides defeasible evidence for impossibility). In this essay, I’m 
going to assume that imagining something provides justification for believing in its metaphysical 
possibility and a failed attempt to imagine something provides justification for believing in its 
metaphysical impossibility.1 
Now I want to say something slightly more controversial. Whereas imagination is not our only 
epistemic route to modality, the epistemic connection between imagination and modality is special. 
This connection is how the idea of objective modality enters our intellectual lives in the first place. It 
captures our rudimentary grasp of objective modality in the same way PP captures our rudimentary 
grasp of objective chance. My contention is that, if the idea of objective possibility and necessity has 
any intellectual traction on us to begin with, it stems from what we can or cannot imagine. This 
modal epistemic connection can serve as an intellectual anchor that guides our search for a theory of 
modal reality in the same way PP sets us on the right path in search for a theory of objective chance. 
So, a proper theory of objective modality should be able to explain the way our imagination provides 
evidence for modal claims intuitively. 
By “the way our imagination provides evidence for modal claims”, I mean not only how our 
imagination succeeds in justifying modal claims but also how imagination fails to justify modal claims 
in certain cases (i.e. how imagination-based justification may be epistemically defeated). This essay is 
particularly interested in the latter.2 The goal of this essay is to argue that, using the imagination-
modality connection as our Archimedean point and attending particularly to how imagination-based 
 
1 Of course, there are skeptics, e.g., Van Inwagen (1998). But the goal of this essay isn’t to address the skeptics. I also 
limit myself to current imaginings. I set aside whether having been able to imagine something in the past counts as evidence 
for possibility. 
2 The emphasis on the epistemic defeat is what sets my project apart from Peacocke’s (1999), which seeks to integrate 
the epistemology and metaphysics of modality. 
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modal justification gets defeated, we have good reason to think that the proper logical structure of 
modal reality is S4 instead of S5. 
 
2 The Curious Case of Etiological Defeat 
Let’s focus on the justification for possibilities and set aside justification for impossibilities for the 
moment. Imagination-based modal justification may be presented as epistemically analogous to 
perceptual justification, as Yablo puts it: 
 
Without suggesting that Hume would go quite so far, I take the idea to be that conceiving is 
in a certain way analogous to perceiving. Just as someone who perceives that p enjoys the 
appearance that p is true, whoever finds p conceivable enjoys something worth describing as 
the appearance that it is possible. In slogan form: conceiving involves the appearance of 
possibility. (1993, 5)3 
 
And Geirsson, for example, appeals to this analogy in response to those who are skeptical of 
imaginability’s relevance for modal justification because of its fallibility: 
 
That I can imagine a scenario where something appears true while it cannot be true does not 
mean that conceivability does not carry with it justification of beliefs of what is possible. It is 
a general feature of justification that it does not guarantee truth, and that one can be justified 
in believing what is false. For example, perceptual beliefs are typically justified although they 
do not guarantee truth. (2005, 296) 
 
3 Yablo and Geirsson don’t distinguish conceivability and imaginability. 
Forthcoming in Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Christopher Badura & Amy Kind (ed). Routledge. 5 
 
If I perceive a piece of broccoli, I have prima facie justification for believing that there is a piece of 
broccoli. In the same way, my imagining a talking donkey gives me prima facie justification for 
believing that a talking donkey is possible. Imagination is like perception of the modal space. 
Although perception can be used as an analogy to illustrate the sense in which imagination 
provides prima facie modal justification, there are significant differences. For our purpose in 
particular, epistemic defeat for perceptual justification and imagination-based modal justification 
don’t seem to work the same way. 
 My perceiving a spider gives me prima facie justification to believe that there is one. Such 
justification is defeasible. Here is one way my perceptual justification may be defeated: being told 
that I just consumed some hallucinogenic mushrooms. The information that I have consumed a 
hallucinogenic substance undermines the support that my perceptual experience provides to my 
belief that there is a spider. This kind of epistemic defeater is standardly called an undermining or 
undercutting defeater. (This is in contrast to rebutting defeaters, which are evidence against the belief at 
stake directly, not the epistemic force of the prima facie justification involved.)4 
More specifically, the kind of undermining defeater involved in this scenario is etiological. The 
justificatory force of my perception is undermined by information about the causal origin of the 
perception. This is worth mentioning because not all undermining defeaters are etiological. For 
example, in the well-known fake barn case, if I’m told about the existence of the numerous fake 
barns in the area, my perceptual justification for thinking that I’m standing in front of a barn is 
undermined, yet there is nothing wrong about the causal origin of my perceptual experience. 
 
4 The distinction between undermining and rebutting defeaters is due to Pollock (1987). See also Sturgeon (2012) and 
Melis (2014) for further analysis of the distinction. 
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 By contrast, unlike perceptual justification, it seems that etiological undermining defeaters don’t 
work for imagination-based modal justification for beliefs about possibility. Suppose I’m justified to 
believe that a talking donkey is a metaphysical possibility because I imagined one. Say I’m told that I 
started imagining and fantasizing about talking donkeys because someone slipped something into my 
drink. Without the drug, being an uptight person (or perhaps I suffer from some kind of 
aphantasia), I wouldn’t be able to imagine such nonsense even if I tried. Does this information 
about the causal origin of my imagining undermine the modal justification my imagining provides? 
I’m inclined to say no. It would have undermined my perceptual justification for believing that there is 
an actual talking donkey if the substance caused me to see talking donkeys. But as long as I’m really 
imagining talking donkeys, I don’t see how that etiological information undermines my justification 
for believing that talking donkeys are possible in light of my imagination. 
The same is true even if the source of my imagination is more invasive. Perhaps my imagining a 
talking donkey is caused by a neurosurgeon stimulating certain areas of my brain. Whereas this kind 
of information would undermine perceptual justification about what is actual, it doesn’t undermine 
the modal justification provided by my imagination. Assuming that imagination provides modal 
justification, it provides modal justification regardless of the imagining’s causal origin.5 
This disanalogy between imagination-based modal justification and perceptual justification 
alone is interesting and calls for an explanation, but the puzzle runs deeper. Although it seems that 
 
5 One might argue that perceptual justification is based on a perceptual experience’s causal connection with the 
perceived in normal circumstances. That isn’t the case for imagination-based justification about possibility. Hence, 
etiological information may defeat perceptual justification but not imagination-based justification about possibility. I 
don’t know that this is a good explanation. I’m skeptical of this view about perceptual justification because of the New 
Demon Problem: although perceptual experience in the Matrix doesn’t provide knowledge, it should still provide 
justification. 
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there is no etiological undermining defeater to modal justification for possibility based on our 
imagination, modal justification for believing that something is impossible based on a failed attempt to 
imagine something can be undermined etiologically. For example, if I find myself incapable of 
imagining something, I have prima facie justification for believing that that thing is impossible. But if 
I’m then told that my imagination’s failure is due to a brain injury, that information would 
undermine my modal justification for believing that that thing is impossible.6 
Recognizing this asymmetry in etiological defeat can play an important role in modal 
epistemological discussions. For example, Kung (2010) states that non-sensory imagination – unlike 
sensory imaginations – is far too liberal to be of value for modal justification. How does he argue 
that non-sensory imagination is too liberal? Kung’s strategy is to first identify what constrains our 
capacity to imagine something (i.e., what stops us from being able to imagine something) and then 
argue that such constraints are not relevant to objective modality. Since the only constraints on 
imagination are not relevant to what is objectively possible, he concludes that our power of 
imagination isn’t sufficiently constrained to provide evidence for objective possibilities. 
Notice that learning about what constrains our capacity to imagine is simply to obtain 
information about the source of our inability to imagine something. This kind of information can 
indeed undermine justification for believing that something is impossible based on what we cannot 
imagine. If Kung has succeeded in showing that the factors that prevent us from imagining 
something – in a non-sensory way – are irrelevant to objective modality, he may have offered a 
general reason to undermine the legitimacy of using our inability to non-sensorily imagine as evidence 
 
6 Information about the origin of one’s unimaginability can undermine modal justification for impossibility even if it 
doesn’t involve brain injury. See Levin (2011) for a discussion of the epistemic significance of imaginative resistance as a 
source of unimaginability. 
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for the impossibility. However, even if we grant him that, given what we have said about the 
asymmetry that etiological defeaters work for undermining justification for impossibility based on 
our inability to imagine but do not work for undermining justification for possibility based on our 
imagination, it remains unclear that we should jump to any conclusion about justification for 
possibility based on what we can and do imagine.7 
There is certainly much more to be said about the application of this epistemological 
asymmetry. One might even question the reality of this asymmetry. In this essay, I take this apparent 
asymmetry at face value as a starting point. My goal is to show that, assuming as a premise that this 
asymmetry in the imagination-modality connection obtains, and assuming as a premise that the 
imagination-modality connection is an Archimedean point for theorizing about modality, this 
asymmetry presents a substantive constraint upon our view about the modal reality. 
 
3 Lewisian Chance-Credence Norm 
To explain the asymmetry regarding epistemic defeat for modal justification, we need to explain two 
facts: 
 
[Etiological Immunity] modal justification about possibility based on imagination is not 
defeasible etiologically; and 
[Etiological Vulnerability] modal justification about impossibility based on inability to 
imagine is defeasible etiologically. 
 
 
7 See Lam (2018) for a further discussion. 
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There is a ready explanation for [Etiological Immunity] based on Lewis’s PP. So, let’s take a closer 
look at this chance-credence norm first. 
Credence and chance are different things. Yet, if one’s credence about something is supposed 
to be reflected in one’s rational betting behavior, then it’s plausible to think that there is some 
rational connection between the two. After all, our rational betting behaviors should be somehow 
sensitive to what the chances are. 
PP says that how certain we are about a proposition (i.e., our credence) should match the 
objective chance of that proposition. Or, in technical terms that some philosophers somehow 
prefer: a subject S’s credence for a proposition Q conditional on the proposition that the objective 
chance of Q is x should be equal to x. So, if I believe that there is 0.3 chance that it will rain, my 
credence for the fact that it will rain should also be 0.3. 
This is of course a simplification of the matter. Lewis argues that there is what he calls 
inadmissible evidence that, when present, breaks the rational connection between credence and 
objective chance. To put it in terms of notation introduced earlier, Lewis explains inadmissible 
evidence about Q as a piece of evidence that is directly about Q – not by being a piece of evidence 
about chance. 
Here’s an example to illustrate the idea. Say a coin, which I believe was a fair coin, was flipped 
in my absence. A friend tells me that it landed heads. Notice that my friend’s testimony is evidence 
for the proposition that the coin landed on head. It isn’t evidence about the chance of it landing 
heads. The testimony is therefore inadmissible evidence. (By contrast, information about the past 
frequency of the coin landing heads would be evidence about the chance of it landing heads. Such 
information would be admissible evidence.) In this case, despite my believing that the coin was fair 
and had a 0.5 chance of landing heads, I am not thereby rationally required to have 0.5 credence that 
the coin was going to land heads. Given the testimonial justification for believing that it has landed 
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heads, my rational credence for that should be higher than 0.5 (see Lewis 1980, 265). Having 
inadmissible evidence (i.e. the testimony from my friend) breaks the chance-credence connection. 
So, what PP says isn’t that our credence should track what we believe to be the chance of things no 
matter what. The thought is that credence should track objective chance given any admissible 
evidence and admissible evidence alone. 
It’s contentious how “admissibility” is to be analyzed more rigorously and, accordingly, what 
exactly is inadmissible. On one occasion, Lewis argues that information directly about the future is 
all inadmissible (e.g., a crystal ball that reveals the future directly) and information about the past and 
probabilistic laws of nature are all admissible. But the example about testimonial evidence indicates 
that some information about the past can be inadmissible evidence that breaks the chance-credence 
norm. Different philosophers have since then offered different ways to formalize or standardize the 
idea.8 
I’m not going to engage in those debates in this essay because, for those who accept that 
imagination provides modal justification, imagination is admissible evidence. This might be surprising 
to some. One might be tempted to think that, since perceptual evidence is not evidence about 
chance and therefore inadmissible,9 if we model imagination-based justification about possibility 
with perceptual justification about actuality, perhaps we should think that imagination-based modal 
evidence is inadmissible evidence as well. But notice: the fact that a state of affairs p is possible just is 
the fact that there is a non-zero chance that p. Evidence about possibility is evidence about chance, 
unlike perceptual justification. Therefore, evidence for possibility is admissible. Since modal 
 
8 For example, see Hall (1994), Thau (1994), Vranas (2004), Ismael (2008), Pettigrew (2013). 
9 This is unless one thinks of our minds as predictive systems through and through, see Clark (2013). 
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evidence is admissible and doesn’t break the chance-credence normative connection, the exact 
analysis of admissibility doesn’t make significant difference to what I’m going to say. 
 
4 Explaining Etiological Immunity 
Let’s take a step back from modal justification and think about evidence more generally. To receive 
information as evidence for p is to accept information that, all else being equal, should boost one’s 
credence for p. If a piece of information doesn’t make it rational to be more certain about p, that 
piece of information isn’t evidence for p. 
A rational person’s credence at a time should satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. So, a 
rational person’s credence updating should be governed by Bayes’ Theorem (assuming P(B) > 0): 
P(A|B) = P(B|A)P(A)/P(B). This dictates that, if P(A) = 0, there is no B such that P(A|B) is non-
zero. In other words, if a rational person is absolutely certain that A isn’t the case so that Cr(A) = 0 
(where Cr stands for the person’s credence function at a time), then no information should be able to 
boost her credence over zero. Since evidence boosts credence, a rational person should never think 
that there is evidence for A if she begins with Cr(A) = 0. On the flip side, if she thinks that there 
may be evidence for A, her credence for A should be non-zero. 
Now let us consider the following state of affairs: 
 
Z: it is possible that ψ. 
 
If a rational person thinks that there is any evidence for Z at all, her credence for Z must be non-zero 
(due to Bayes’ Theorem). Then the chance-credence norm PP dictates that she ought to believe that 
Z has a non-zero chance. It would have been irrational of her to believe that there is no chance for Z 
yet have some degree of belief that Z is the case. As I have stated in the previous section, to say that 
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something is possible just is to say that that thing has a non-zero chance. In other words, this rational 
person, who ought to believe that there is a non-zero chance that Z, ought to believe that it is 
possible that Z; otherwise, she shouldn’t believe that there can be any evidence for Z at all. 
Here is a modal logic principle: 
 
[Possibly Possible] If it is possibly possible that p, then it is possible that p (◊◊p → 
◊p). 
 
To think that it’s possible that Z is to think that it is possibly possible that ψ. The principle [Possibly 
Possible] requires that, if a rational person believes that it is possible that Z (hence ◊◊ ψ), she ought 
to also believe that it is possible that ψ. So, based on Lewis’s PP and [Possibly Possible], a rational 
person who thinks that there is evidence that it is possible that ψ ought logically to believe that it is 
possible that ψ. 
Notice that this is a very substantive claim. That there is evidence for p doesn’t normally entail 
that p even for an ideal rational agent. When a rational person hears her cat vomiting, that auditory 
experience is evidence for the fact that her cat is vomiting. That doesn’t, however, entail that her cat 
is vomiting. The perceptual evidence is non-conclusive. What we have shown based on PP and 
[Possibly Possible] is that evidence for statements about possibility works differently. That there is 
evidence for a statement about something’s being possible entails that the statement is true. In other 
words, there is only conclusive evidence for possibility. If we think that imagination provides 
evidence for possibility at all, we ought to think that it’s conclusive evidence. 
This explains [Etiological Immunity]. If I managed to imagine a talking donkey, I ought to 
believe that it’s possible for there to be talking donkeys. Since entailment is monotonic, no extra 
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information can undermine the evidence for the possibility of a talking donkey. That is why it should 
not change anything to learn that my imagination is triggered by a surgeon stimulating my brain. 
 
5 Defeating an Appeal to Conclusive Evidence 
My explanation of [Etiological Immunity] is based on my demonstrating that one’s imagining 
something entails its possibility in virtue of PP and [Possibly Possible]. I reckon that most would 
find the entailment claim intuitively questionable. Unlike Hume, most philosophers who endorse 
imagination-based modal justification find it too strong to claim that imagination entails possibility. 
Even Chalmers (2002), who argues that conceivability entails possibility, only defends the view that 
ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
One can see where the hesitation comes from. We appear to imagine things that are impossible. 
For example, here’s a mathematical statement: there is at least one prime number between 155921 
and 360653. Given how many numbers there are between 155921 and 360653, one might think that 
one can imagine finding a prime number between them. The truth is, there are no prime numbers 
between them. Assuming that mathematical statements have their truth-value necessarily, it’s 
necessary that there are no prime numbers between 155921 and 360653. So, as a source of evidence 
for possibility, our imagination seems obviously fallible. And that seems to undercut my explanation 
for [Etiological Immunity]. 
Actually, my explanation of [Etiological Immunity] is compatible with our appeal to imagination 
for modal justification being fallible. To illustrate why, let’s consider a mathematical proof. A proof 
is conclusive evidence for a mathematical statement. If a person has a proof for a mathematical 
statement p, that is the end of the matter. One doesn’t go on to weigh the strength of various 
evidence for p after that. But this doesn’t mean that, when she presents her justification for p by 
constructing a proof, she is infallible. There can still be an epistemic defeater for her justification for 
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accepting p. If information becomes available that indicates that what she presented was in fact not 
a proof for p at all (perhaps there was a mistake in her attempt to construct a proof), her justification 
would be nullified. This information shows that she has misidentified something as a proof and 
hence as evidence for p. Mathematical proofs are conclusive but our ability to identify proofs is 
fallible. As Peacocke (2003) rightly points out: 
 
[We should] distinguish two kinds of defeasibility, which I will call defeasibility of 
identification and defeasibility of grounds. A ground for accepting a proposition can be 
conclusive even though our entitlement to believe that we have identified such a ground is 
defeasible. Identifying something as a conclusive ground is one thing; its being a conclusive 
ground is another. (30) 
 
Let us call this an Identification Defeater. 
To think that evidence for possibility, focusing on imagination for our purposes, must be 
conclusive is compatible with our fallibility because our ability to identify relevant imaginings is 
fallible. For example, I could think that I was imagining finding a prime number between 155921 
and 360653, but all I was in fact doing was imagining my reaction to finding such a number instead of 
imagining there being such a number. (For example, I might react by thinking out loud, “Huh, so there is 
a prime number between 155921 and 360653. I wonder whether there is a second one.”) So, 
perhaps, our imaginings are modal epistemologically fallible not because imagination is inconclusive, 
just like mathematicians are fallible not because mathematical proofs are inconclusive. 
This echoes much of what we see in debates about metaphysical modality. Consider the claim 
that light is a stream of photons, which Kripke considers necessary a posteriori if true. There is an 
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anti-essentialist concern that light might have turned out to be something else. We could imagine a 
scenario where there are photons firing yet we see no light. Kripke’s response is: 
 
Imagine a situation in which human beings were blind or their eyes didn’t work. They were 
unaffected by light. Would that have been a situation in which light did not exist? It seems to 
me that it would not. It would have been a situation in which our eyes were not sensitive to 
light. […] Even if all people had had awful vestigial growths and just couldn’t see a thing, the 
light might have been around; but it would not have been able to affect people’s eyes in the 
proper way. (1980, 129-130) 
 
Kripke’s point is that the anti-essentialists are mistaken about the content of their imagining. They are 
not, as they thought they are, imagining a scenario with photons but no light. Instead, they are 
imagining a scenario where there is light but people have no ability to detect light. 
The question is: why go this route? If imagination is inconclusive modal evidence, Kripke could 
have simply said that the anti-essentialists have indeed imagined a scenario in which there is a stream 
of photon and no light, but maintained that imagination is defeasible and this is a case in which light 
remains essentially a stream of photon despite what we imagine. Note that it is not at all clear that 
this is a weaker defense than saying that the anti-essentialists are wrong about the content of their 
own imagining: they aren’t really imagining light being something other than streams of photons, 
Hesperus not being identical to Phosphorus, water being something other than H2O, etc. 
The same applies to the Kripkean defense of dualism about phenomenal qualities. Kripke states 
that it is conceivable for us to have C-fibers firing without the feeling of pain. Central to Kripke’s 
defense is the argument that, since we couldn’t have been mistakenly imagining something else when 
we appeared to be imagining ourselves to have C-fibers firing without the feeling of pain (due to our 
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direct reference to both), and since identity is necessary, we should conclude that pain is not C-fibers 
firing.  
A similar question arises: what is the point of focusing on arguing whether one could have been 
mistaken about the content of one’s imagination? The question wouldn’t have been even half as 
pressing if Kripke alone chooses to go down this road. On the contrary, a huge portion of the 
literature – from both dualists and physicalists – on philosophical zombies has been devoted to 
pinning down a proper characterization of the content of the relevant imaginings (e.g., the analysis 
of phenomenal concepts). This is puzzling. If imagination is inconclusive evidence for possibility, a 
physicalist can simply concede that we can imagine pain and C-fibers firing coming apart yet note 
that this is just one of those cases in which our imagination gets modality wrong. It’s unclear how 
much extra dialectical mileage, if any, dualists can gain from cornering physicalists into conceding 
that we couldn’t have been imagining something else when we imagine zombies.10 
All this makes sense, however, with what we said about [Etiological Immunity]. If imagination 
is evidence for possibility, imagination entails possibility; and thus the only way to defeat an appeal 
to imagination as evidence for possibility is by showing that the alleged imagining in fact didn’t 
happen (i.e., presenting an Identification Defeater). That’s why essentialists need to argue that the 
anti-essentialists aren’t really imagining light and photon streams coming apart. And that’s why it’s a 
challenge physicalists need to take seriously if dualists are right that there is no plausible way to 
reinterpret what dualists claim to be an imagining about zombies into an imagining about something 
else (or not as an instance of the relevant kind of imagining at all). 
The result is what Kung (2016) calls the Error Theory about imagination, which says that we 
cannot imagine what is impossible and, if we thought we have imagined something impossible, it is 
 
10 For more examples of debates that appear to assume that imaginability implies possibility, see Kind (2016). 
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an error and something else must have happened. Kung objects that, if we set our modal 
epistemology aside and try to just honestly describe our imagination, it is far more intuitive to 
acknowledge that we can imagine the impossible.11 
To reinterpret and restrict intuitive cases of imaginings as the Error Theory suggests is, 
according to Kung, to adopt a “telescopic view of imagining” that uses “imagine” as a success term 
like “see” (2016, 91). One cannot see what does not exist because there is nothing to see; similarly, 
one cannot imagine what is impossible because there is nothing to imagine. What one ends up with 
is a “modal-conclusion-first reasoning” (ibid, 104): one attributes imaginings (to oneself and others) 
according to one’s prior modal beliefs. Kung thinks that doing so snuffs out any hope of using 
imagination as a guide to possibility. 
My appeal to Identification Defeaters is to embrace the Error Theory. One thing that makes 
Kung suspicious of the Error Theory is that philosophers like Kripke offer no clear motivation for 
the view that flies in the face of our ordinary self-ascriptions of imaginings. And it isn’t immediately 
clear that we need to use “imagine” as a success term to treat imagination as a guide to possibility. 
Now we know better. There is an independent reason to accept the Error Theory. It follows 
from two highly intuitive principles: Lewis’s PP and [Possibly Possible]. We obtain a neat 
explanation for [Etiological Immunity] as a result. 
Note that even those who reject the Error Theory should accept that our self-ascriptions of 
imaginings are fallible. Attitude ascriptions aren’t immune to the same cost-benefit analysis that all 
our other beliefs are subjected to. One may refuse to revise our ascriptions of imagining as the Error 
 
11 See also Kind (2016) and Priest (2016: 2658-2659). Priest proposes a logic for imagination that allows impossible 
worlds to be imagined. Embracing the Error Theory, I clearly don’t accept this as the logic for imagination. Yet, none of 
this prevents us from accepting a semantics that includes impossible worlds for modeling thoughts about modality itself. 
For simplicity’s sake, however, I’ll focus on normal modal logic for that is the standard treatment for objective modality. 
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Theory requires. The cost is having to reject either PP or [Possibly Possible] and leave [Etiological 
Immunity] unexplained. People may value the trade differently. But the Error Theory is not obviously 
getting a bad bargain. Surely, it opens the gates to some “modal-conclusion-first reasonings” that 
revise our imagining ascriptions based on modal facts external to a theory of imagination. That 
doesn’t mean we can no longer rely on imagination as a guide to possibility. It just means using 
imagination to reach possibility is a holistic enterprise. One person’s modus ponens is another person’s 
modus tollens. And I don’t see why taking a person’s self-report of imaginings seriously implies, as 
Kind (2016, 347) seems to suggest, that revisions to our imagining ascriptions must be based entirely 
on factors internal to a theory of imagination. 
 
6 Explaining Etiological Vulnerability 
Suppose we are satisfied with the explanation for [Etiological Immunity]. What is possible and what 
is impossible are closely tied logically. It’s natural to wonder whether what I argued for about 
evidence for possibility would logically lead to something similar about evidence for impossibility. 
But that would be bad news given that we want to explain [Etiological Vulnerability]. 
Here’s a parallel argument for the conclusiveness of evidence for impossibility. To have evidence 
that a state of affairs is impossible is to have evidence that the negation of that state of affairs is 
necessary. Let’s consider the following state of affair: 
 
T: it is necessary that ψ. 
 
Again, a rational person’s credence is governed by Bayes’ Theorem. So, for a rational person to have 
evidence for T, her credence for T, i.e., Cr(T), has to be non-zero. The Principal Principle then says 
that she ought to believe that there is a non-zero chance that T is the case. The fact that T has a 
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non-zero chance just is the fact that T is possible. Hence, a rational person ought to think that it’s 
possible that T, i.e., that it is possibly necessary that ψ, if she thinks that there is evidence for T. 
 Here is a modal logic principle: 
 
[Necessarily Possible] If it is possible that p, then it is necessarily possible that p 
(◊p → □◊p). 
 
[Necessarily Possible] is logically equivalent to its contrapositive: ~□◊p → ~◊p, which is, in turn, 
equivalent to ◊□~p → □~p and, hence, ◊□p → □p (by substitution). 
 Since PP requires that a rational person who believes that there is evidence for T to believe that 
it’s possibly necessary that ψ, it requires her to believe that it’s necessary that ψ. As I mentioned, 
every statement about necessity just is a statement about something being impossible. Therefore, a 
rational person is required to think that, if there is any evidence that something is impossible at all, 
that evidence is conclusive. If a rational agent thinks that a failed attempt to imagine that p is 
evidence that p is impossible, she ought to think that her failed attempt is conclusive evidence that p 
is indeed impossible. 
 But that cannot be if we want to think about objective modality in a way that is in line with the 
modal epistemic behavior of imagination, which includes the way imagination-based modal 
justification can/cannot be undermined by defeaters. Specifically, although one’s inability to imagine 
that p is evidence that p is impossible, that evidence can be undermined by information about the 
source of such inability – [Etiological Vulnerability]. Learning that your inability to imagine that p is 
due to a brain injury defeats your inconceivability-based modal justification for thinking that it is 
impossible that p. To do so, this defeater doesn’t need to suggest that you aren’t really incapable of 
imagining p; that is, evidence for impossibility can be defeated by something other than an 
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Identification Defeater. Evidence for possibility ought to be conclusive; evidence for impossibility 
need not be. To preserve this epistemic asymmetry, something in this parallel argument must go. 
Here is my hypothesis. The best way to explain [Etiological Immunity] without sacrificing 
[Etiological Vulnerability] is to accept the principle [Possibly Possible], which is key to my 
explanation of [Etiological Immunity], while giving up the principle [Necessarily Possible], which is 
key to the argument for the conclusiveness of evidence for impossibility. 
Doing so has substantive implications about the shape of the objective modal landscape. 
[Possibly Possible] is a theorem in the modal logic system S4 and [Necessarily Possible] is a theorem 
in the system S5 but not S4. In other words, to think of modal reality in a way that is in sync with 
the modal epistemic behavior of imagination, we better think of objective modality as being 
governed by S4 instead of S5. In S4, the accessibility relation among possible worlds is not symmetric. 
That means, w1 can be possible with respect to w2 without w2 being possible with respect to w1. But 
S4’s accessibility relation is reflexive so that w2 is possible with respect to itself. As a result, it isn’t 
logically guaranteed that what is possible with respect to one possible world must also be possible 
with respect to all other possible worlds. 
This is a significant result. Philosophers have long been interested in the true logic for objective 
modality with S5 being the most popular system. But discussions on this topic often have the fates 
of S4 and S5 bundled together. Whereas there is a heated debate about whether S4 can be the true 
logic for metaphysical modality, the arguments involved are typically applicable to both S4 and S5. 
For example, Chandler (1976) and Salmon (1989) challenge S4 by arguing against [Possibly Possible] 
based on the assumption that, although it’s possible for a material object to have a slightly different 
material constitution, it’s impossible for it to have a massively different material constitution. There 
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are ways to resist their objection. The details do not concern us here.12 The relevant point is that 
[Possibly Possible] is a theorem of both S4 and S5. The fates of S4 and S5 are therefore bundled 
together in this debate. By studying the modal epistemic behavior of imagination, we obtain an 
argument in favor of S4 against S5; and we do so without treating this conclusion simply as a result 
of our prior commitment to some substantive metaphysics of modality.13 
 
7 Overkill? 
My explanation of the modal epistemic behaviors of imagination specifically – [Etiological 
Immunity] and [Etiological Vulnerability] – is based on my argument about the way modal evidence 
in general behaves (or should behave). In this section, I’ll discuss the potential worry that my 
approach overkills: while capturing the epistemic behaviors of imagination, my explanation implies 
the same for all sources of modal justification; and that may not be a desirable consequence. 
Even those who acknowledge that imagination is a source of modal justification would never go 
so far as to say that it’s the only source. There is no way I can cover every possible source of modal 
justification.14 What I’ll do instead is to focus on testimonial justification for modal claims as a case 
study. My hope is that, by showing how my explanation’s implication for testimonial modal 
 
12 See Yagisawa (2017), Murray & Wilson (2012), Roca-Royes (2011; 2006). 
13 For example, if one is committed to Armstrong’s (1989) combinatorial metaphysics of modality, one would accept S4 
and reject S5. 
14 There are those who base their view on conceivability or imaginability (e.g. Yablo 1993, Geirsson 2005), there are 
those who rest their view on postulating the faculty of modal intuition (e.g. Bealer 2002; Fiocco 2007), there are those 
who rely on our implicit knowledge of the principle of admissible interpretations (e.g. Peacock 2003), and there are those 
who appeal to our power of forming supposition (e.g. Ichikawa & Jarvis 2012). 
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justification isn’t as objectionable as it first seems, I can offer some assurance that it isn’t implausible 
for my explanation to imply something similar for all forms of modal justification. 
I’m justified in believing that there is a non-zero chance for a closed system’s entropy to decrease 
over a limited time span. That is, it’s possible that a closed system’s entropy decreases over a limited 
amount of time. As someone who has no advanced knowledge in physics, my justification is based 
on textbooks: a textbook case of justification by testimony. (Pun intended!) 
If we grant that there is testimonial justification for modal claims, and if I’m right that evidence 
for possibility must be conclusive, testimonial justification for claims about possibility must be 
conclusive, too. So, when I received testimony about the possibility of a decrease in entropy, I have 
conclusive evidence that it’s possible. 
As much as we think testimony can provide justification, we think that testimony is fallible, no 
matter what the testimony is about. We might, for example, receive information that the person 
delivering the testimony has been conducting her research with malfunctioning equipment. Similarly, 
on modal matters, we might learn that a person who testifies about chances and possibilities has 
been using a faulty calculator or doing modal logic wrong. In cases like this, it seems clear that 
whatever testimonial justification one gets is defeated. So, my explanation for [Etiological Immunity] 
seems to imply too much by implying that all modal evidence about possibility is conclusive. 
My explanation is derived from PP and [Possibly Possible]. If one doesn’t like the implication, 
one has to give up one of them. Either way, it’s going to be a big theoretical sacrifice; and, on top of 
that, one will need to find another explanation for [Etiological Immunity]. The good news is, one 
doesn’t have to do so. Saying that testimony about possibility is conclusive is not to say that 
appealing to testimony about possibility is indefeasible. Again, we should distinguish the 
conclusiveness of a piece of evidence and the defeasibility of one’s appeal to evidence. 
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To have testimonial justification is to be justified in believing something on the basis of taking 
another person’s testimony at face value. To understand testimonial justification, we need to know 
what constitutes a piece of testimony. All that is uttered is not testimony. 
To be a piece of testimony, the speaker must have the intention that the hearer believes what is 
said. For example, overhearing someone mumbling to herself doesn’t count as a case of testimony in 
the relevant sense because she doesn’t even intend to be heard. Whatever epistemic significance 
overhearing others’ self-talk has, it’s epistemologically unhelpful to lump it together with testimonial 
justification. 
Furthermore, I want to argue that offering testimony is an inherently social phenomenon. What 
counts as testimony doesn’t only depend on the testifier, but also depends on the hearer. Say I move 
to a community where no one speaks English. I cannot offer testimony by speaking English even if 
I sincerely intend to do so. It isn’t that I produce testimony in English but the people fail to pick it 
up. What I say simply doesn’t count as testimony because no one even acknowledges that I’m telling 
them something.15 
As we said earlier, one can receive information indicating that what we thought was a 
mathematical proof is in fact not a mathematical proof. Similarly, testimonial justification is 
susceptible to Identification Defeaters. But, due to testimony’s inherently social nature, 
Identification Defeaters for testimonial justification can happen in two ways. 
 
15 Instead of saying that testimony requires both the speaker’s intention and the hearer’s recognition, Lackey argues that 
we should distinguish two concepts of testimony: speaker testimony and hearer testimony (2006, 187). Since we’re 
interested in testimony as a source of (modal) belief for the hearer, if we accept Lackey’s distinction, we should focus on 
hearer testimony. What someone says doesn’t constitute a piece of hearer testimony if the hearer doesn’t reasonably 
recognize what the speaker says as conveying relevant information. 
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First of all, you might receive information that indicates that what you received from the 
speaker was not intended to be a piece of testimony. Secondly, you might receive information that 
makes you outright refuse to even acknowledge that the speaker said anything meaningful to the 
conversation, shunning the speaker’s contribution. Since testimony is partly constituted by the 
recipient’s recognition, this effectively makes what the speaker said not even count as a piece of 
testimony. 
Testimonial justification is fallible no matter what the testimony is about. This conflicts with my 
view’s implication that testimonial justification for possibility must be conclusive, so the objection 
goes. I agree with the first claim but reject the second one. Just like the fallibility of imagination-
based evidence for possibility, the fallibility of testimony-based evidence for possibility can be 
explained by Identification Defeater. Hence, the fallibility of testimonial justification for possibility is 
compatible with my view, which implies that testimonial justification for possibility is conclusive. 
Let me illustrate with an example. Say someone told me that certain subatomic process L has a 
non-zero chance of happening. I thereby have testimonial justification for believing that L is 
possible. But then I learn that that person makes things up all the time just to look knowledgeable. 
According to my view, the testimonial justification is nullified not because the new information 
undermines the justificatory force of the testimony; instead, it’s because the new information gives 
me reason to simply ignore whatever that person said. With no recognition at all, what she says fails to 
be testimony and I therefore no longer have testimonial justification at all – not just a weakened or 
undermined one – that L is possible. 
 One might wonder: Why should we describe defeaters for testimonial modal justification in the 
way I suggest? I’m not saying that we should. All I’m saying is that this is a coherent way to think about 
my explanation of [Etiological Immunity] and the fallibility of testimonial justification. The mere fact 
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that testimonial justification for modal claims is fallible is therefore not an objection to my 
explanation.16 
 I focus on testimonial justification because it’s a kind of justification that is most obviously 
fallible. But what I said applies to all sources of justification for beliefs about possibility. If it works 
for testimonial justification, it should work for other sources of evidence for possibility. For 
example, some argue that we have modal intuitions for what is possible. If that is the case, such 
intuitions should be conclusive evidence for what is possible. Having modal intuitions should be 
factive. Of course, we are fallible when we appeal to our modal intuitions (assuming that we have 
such a cognitive faculty). But like our appeal to imagination, that is because we are fallible in 
identifying instances of modal intuition. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Modal notions come into our intellectual life via the operation of our imagination. The epistemic 
connection between imagination and modality serves as a constraint upon our attempt to theorize 
about modality. 
 Attempts to integrate the epistemology and metaphysics of modality is not exactly new. My 
treatment of the subject is novel in its emphasis on observing the way epistemic defeaters work for 
imagination-based modal justification. I bring attention to an epistemic asymmetry: whereas 
information about the causal origin of our imagination cannot defeat imagination-based modal 
justification about possibility, information about the causal origin of our inability to imagine can 
 
16 Does my proposal make our appeal to testimony for modal justification circular? No, it just means working with 
testimony is a holistic business. 
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defeat modal justification about impossibility. We should think about modal reality in a way that can 
account for this modal epistemic asymmetry. 
I argue that the best explanation for the asymmetry is by accepting Lewis’s Principal Principle, 
and accepting that the objective modal landscape is governed by S4, not S5. This explanation implies 
that evidence about possibility must be conclusive. Although this seems to go against the fact that our 
modal reasoning is fallible, such fallibility is compatible with our modal justification being conclusive 
as long as we recognize that an appeal to conclusive evidence can be defeated by Identification 
Defeaters. 
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